1967 vs 1948: why the 2000 Camp David Summit failed

The root of the failure, writes former foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami,  was that Israel tried to resolve 1967 but the Palestinians wanted to reverse 1948.

Those of us in the Jewish Left who had long supported a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – that is two states for two peoples –were stunned by the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000 and the associated collapse of the Oslo Peace Accords.

Indeed, understanding and interpreting the real causes and likely implications of that political tragedy divided and polarised many Jewish Left groups round the globe. I felt at that time that the evidence of what was actually happening on the ground in the Middle East compelled a more critical analysis of Palestinian actions and beliefs than had previously been the case.

On reading Shlomo Ben-Ami’s book, I believe that my political judgments at that time were correct. Not that this gives me any smug sense of personal vindication. To the contrary, I would far prefer to be reflecting today on the 20^th or 21^st anniversary of an independent Palestinian state, rather than reviewing a book which pessimistically asserts that such a state is unlikely to ever be born.

Ben-Ami is in an ideal position to review the cataclysmic events of 2000-01. He was the Israeli foreign minister from August 2000-March 2001 and played a leading role in the key peace negotiations with the Palestinians during this period. Ben-Ami is also not a typical Israeli political figure hailing from a military or security background.

Born in Morocco in 1943 (his family emigrated to Israel when he was 12 years old), he was a former academic and diplomat who held dovish political views. If his reflections can be trusted, he consistently sought to encourage prime minister Ehud Barak and his government to be more understanding of the Palestinian narrative, and consequently more accommodating and flexible in their negotiating strategies.

Despite this strong personal desire for achieving a sustainable peace, Ben-Ami is crystal clear in his book that the Palestinians were neither able nor willing to seal the deal. He argues that the Palestinians were always hindered by a range of theological and nationalist assumptions which prevented them from closing what he calls “the optimal peace deal once it was offered”.