What does Syria’s crisis mean for Israel?

For the first time in 13 months, the attention of the world was on the Middle East this weekend, but Israel was not the focus.

Syrian rebels launched an unexpected attack, capturing significant portions of Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city after Damascus, and dealing a massive blow to President Bashar Assad.

What does it mean for Israel?

For Israel, this is good news (Amir Tibon, Haaretz)

Syria’s crisis will divert Iranian attention and resources to a front relatively removed from Tehran's conflict with Jerusalem. Since the war with Lebanon ended, Israeli officials had been talking about the need to exert indirect pressure on Assad in an effort to weaken his alliance with Iran. Now Assad's dependence on the Iranians and Russians has grown, but Tehran has another reason to worry.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convened a security consultation by phone on Friday night about the events in Syria. But his main strategic concern remains Iran.

Israel's assessment is that Tehran is feeling pressured by the return of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and will try to find a way to reach an agreement with the United States under which it would rein in its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. But the Israeli defence establishment also hasn't ruled out the possibility that if the Iranians don't feel the negotiations are bearing fruit, they may take the opposite approach and announce that they have achieved nuclear weapons capability.

Netanyahu is still talking about this being a historic opportunity to deal with Iran's nuclear program, especially since its aerial defence systems were severely damaged by Israel's retaliatory strike on October 26. But the situation will become clear only after Trump re-enters the White House.

Critical, even historical, weakness in Iranian access (Lazar Berman, Times of Israel)

The primary reason for the success of the rebel offensive and the collapse of the regime forces is the effectiveness of Israel’s military operations against Hezbollah and Iran since October 8, 2023.

“The timing is not coincidental,” Carmit Valensi, head of the Northern Arena Program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, told The Times of Israel.

“They identify well the critical, even historical, weakness that the ‘Resistance Axis,’ primarily Hezbollah and Iran, find themselves in,” she continued.

Some Hezbollah and Iran-backed Shiite militia fighters were moved from Syria to contend with the Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon in October. Thousands more were killed and wounded by Israeli air raids, ground forces, and special operations like the stunning attacks in September in which thousands of Hezbollah pagers exploded on their owners.

Iran itself is in a defensive crouch, having lost its two most effective deterrent threats against Israel in Hamas and Hezbollah, and after suffering significant damage in the October 26 Israeli air raid on Iran, itself a response to the regime’s second ballistic missile attack on the Jewish state on October 1.

To make matters worse for Assad’s government, while Hezbollah is diminished, so is Russia. Its focus has been on the long Ukraine fight for almost 3 years, with fewer troops and assets in Syria.

What’s more, with the Donald Trump administration set to take office in a matter of weeks, Iran will likely face increased sanctions and stepped-up pressure on its battered economy.

A weaker Iran, but a new jihadist enemy (Yaron Friedman, Jerusalem Post)

The timing of the events in northwestern Syria is no coincidence, occurring shortly after the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon. For the Syrian regime, the nightmare of instability is becoming a reality. Rebels penetrated deep into Aleppo, revealing severe vulnerabilities. The Syrian army was caught off guard, Russian air support arrived too late, and Shi’ite militias vanished from the scene.

For Israel, the weakening of Iran's presence in Syria is beneficial because it disrupts the transfer of arms to Hezbollah.

However, the emergence of Islamist groups presents a new threat. A fragmented Syria, dominated by extremist factions, could result in a resurgence of global jihadism similar to the rise of ISIS.

Syria is effectively divided into three zones: Kurdish autonomy in the northeast (backed by the US), opposition-controlled areas in the northwest (under Turkey’s influence), and Assad-regime territories in the south-central region (supported by Russia).

The coming days will likely see intensified Russian airstrikes in Aleppo and Idlib, further displacing civilians and escalating the humanitarian crisis.

As the second round of Syria’s civil war unfolds, the question remains: Can the regime survive this latest challenge, or will the weakened Iranian axis mark a turning point?