“A historical accomplishment”: Understanding Hamas, October 7 and Israel’s next move

For years, many in Israel and the West have been in the habit of viewing Hamas as a “historical road accident”: An organisation that owes its existence to grave political errors, committed primarily by Israel.

Israel is argued to have groomed Hamas as a counterweight for the PLO back in the 1980s, and it is further contended that its policy of refraining from advancing the peace negotiations, while weakening the Palestinian Authority, fuels this terror organisation’s clout as it currently dominates the Palestinian system.

While not wrong, these assertions are skewed by egocentricity, namely the tendency to view Israel as the cause of most shifts taking place in the Middle East.

Hamas is a natural product of Palestinian history. Its roots were put down decades before the peace talks began in the Middle East, and even before the State of Israel was established. It reflects profound social, political and cultural trends, led by widespread public identification with radical Islam alongside a growing collective frustration with the PLO that had represented and led the Palestinians for many years.

Hamas claims to be a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate (branches of said movement were set up in Mandatory Palestine back in the 1940s), but one that uniquely struggles against an external enemy. Alongside its primary effort to change society by offering robust civil infrastructures (Da’awa) – an aim shared by all Muslim Brotherhood affiliates worldwide – Hamas also engages in military Jihad that ultimately seeks to annihilate Israel and establish a Palestinian state from the river to the sea.

Hamas refuses to incorporate itself into the PLO, which it views as having abandoned national principles when partaking in peace negotiations, and is strongly tied to the population, particularly the refugee sector of which many Hamas leaders are a part of.

Since its inception in 1987, Hamas has based its strategic decision-making on two principles: consultation (Shura) and consensus (Ijma’). Decisions are made following long consultations, and are binding for all. Consultations are held among the organisation’s four hubs: the “overseas” leadership (currently located in Qatar, Turkey and Lebanon) and those operating from within Israeli prisons, the West Bank, and Gaza. This last leadership is considered the most important since it is the only area where Hamas functions as a regime, governing Palestinian territory as well as the local population.

Since its establishment, Hamas has frequently engaged in deliberate concealment and deception. It conveys the false image of an alleged distinction between its military and political branches (although, in practice, both are deeply intertwined); it presents itself as a “legitimate resistance movement”, using this front to justify any act of terror, including the killing of civilians, as a form of defence employed by a weak victim; it spreads manipulative illusions that center on its willingness to promote a political arrangement based on the two-state vision (while reiterating that it will never recognise Israel, and that its annihilation is imperative); and “fuses” itself into the public sphere while making cynical use of schools, hospitals, cemeteries and kindergartens for military purposes.

The October 7 attack, and the ensuing war, is the most dramatic step taken by Hamas since its inception, and the strongest blow delivered by the Palestinians to Israel, which regarded them as a relatively weak challenge. The attack demonstrated Hamas’ successful steering of the national agenda, while marginalising the Palestinian Authority, which suffers from a low image domestically. This development has garnered widespread support for Hamas and its agenda – including the October 7 massacre – as reflected in public opinion polls conducted in recent months.

The brutal attack was carried out in violation of the political arrangement between Israel and Hamas in recent years, whereby Israel has attempted to improve the civilian state of affairs in Gaza (wrongly believing that it would lower the chances of escalation), and consisted of war crimes emanating from acute dehumanisation of Israelis in general, and Jews in particular.

This step was not the product of realpolitik considerations, such as the desire to undermine the emerging normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, strengthen Hamas’ image in the Palestinian arena, or even lead to the mass release of prisoners from Israeli prisons.

The logic behind the attack has its roots in ideology. Yahya Sinwar, head of Hamas in Gaza, has been working on it for a decade, and views it as his life mission, while believing himself to be the contemporary reincarnation of Salah al-Din, fighting the crusaders until he will liberate Jerusalem from their rule.

According to his vision, it was part of a long historical journey that will end with Israel’s annihilation and may not come to fruition in his lifetime or may, indeed, claim his life. Sinwar knows Israeli society well, having spent 23 years in Israeli prisons, and must have realised he would not defeat Israel on October 7. However, he strove to rattle Israeli society’s confidence, drive a wedge between Israelis and their elected leadership, and begin keeping a blood score that would prevent the two nations from reaching any form of arrangement in future. From these perspectives, he seems to have had considerable success.

Seven months into the war, Sinwar can conclude that its outcome to date, although mixed, is leaning toward favourable: He has personally survived; his organisation remains the most dominant force in Gaza; Israel is struggling to reach internal consensus about the strategy of the war, whereas its image and international relations are severely dented; and no substantial protest has risen against him from within the Palestinian public.

From Hamas’ point of view, impeding Israeli victory while successfully causing it pain and despair is nothing short of a historical accomplishment. Sinwar regards the unprecedented damage and the fact that 1-1.5 percent of the Gazan population has been killed is a price worth paying to advance his ideological goals.

Israel therefore faces an old threat with new intensity. Despite the heavy blows it has been delivered, Hamas continues to maintain military capabilities across the Gaza Strip; still has the final word on hostage negotiations; and rules the public order in Gaza while foiling any attempt to establish alternatives to its regime, such as family clan rule or allowing the Palestinian Authority to gain control of Gaza, declaring that it would take action against any international force that will try to establish new order in the region.

Israel has, in effect, reached a T-junction in its campaign. On the one hand is an alternative to toppling Hamas rule, which requires Gaza to be occupied in its entirety and control to be taken over the area for an unlimited period of time until another viable alternative to Hamas will be formed. On the other hand, is the implementation of a deal releasing all hostages at the price of ending the war, having the IDF withdraw fully from Gaza, and releasing numerous terrorists from Israeli prison.

It is becoming gradually clearer that a third alternative does not exist, since the war continuing at the same low intensity that has characterised it over the past few months will not lead to Hamas’ collapse.

In view of the fact that Israel currently lacks the ability and desire to occupy Gaza in its entirety – among other things due to the attention it must give to the growing tension on the northern front – it must seal a deal at this time despite the heavy price it will have to pay.

Ending the war will allow for the internal healing needed on all levels, while providing Israel with the opportunity to begin preparing organised strategic plans for toppling Hamas rule – this time at its own initiative, and at the time it deems fit, while relying on more realistic assumptions that those that served it on the days leading up to October 7, which turned out to be a mere misconception torn to shreds.

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