The creeping normalisation of antisemitism in Australia

There was something about the attack on the East Melbourne synagogue last month, and the response to it, led by discussion on social media, that struck a nerve. An anonymous post on a Jewish Facebook group asked whether anyone else was starting to think about emigrating. The environment in Melbourne had changed for the Jewish community, and it warns of a broader threat to the wider Australian society and the values that bind us. The attack was not the cause, but like the breakers caught in the beam of a lighthouse, for a moment many in the Jewish community could see the threat more clearly.

What did we see? A new report from the Online Hate Prevention Institute (OHPI) shares 71 examples of online responses to news of the attack on the East Melbourne Synagogue and the other antisemitic events that weekend. The report also includes 43 additional examples, some collected right after the Adass attack and now shared by OHPI for the first time, and others collected in response to the announcement of the Plan to Combat Antisemitism by the Jillian Segal, Australia’s Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism. The examples are numbered, and I share some in this article.

When the Adass synagogue was firebombed in December, and again when East Melbourne Synagogue was let alight, there were voices that welcomed the attack. One response to the latest attack reads: “The Austrian painter didn’t finish his job, not properly enough, that’s the biggest problem.” (page 31 of the Institute’s report) I’m sure readers don’t need me to explain this reference to Hitler and his self-appointed “job” of systematically murdering every Jew in Europe.

Other responses dismissed the attacks as “false flags”, staged by Jewish interests, designed to generate underserved sympathy for the Jewish community. When the Federal member for Wentworth, Allegra Spender, said she was appalled at the attack on the East Melbourne Synagogue and Miznon restaurant and called them a “disgusting and dangerous intimidation of the Jewish community”, someone responded: “we’re suspecting another false flag event… in Melbourne we’ve experienced a lot of them recently (p35).”

The reply dismissed not only these attacks, but the entire antisemitism crisis that Jews in Melbourne are experiencing. There is no need to recount the litany of antisemitic incidents over almost two years now since October 7.

Many went further, blaming the Jewish community itself for being behind the attacks. Federal Liberal Leader Sussan Ley wrote: “what happened in Melbourne last night was horrifying. A synagogue set alight while families gathered for Shabbat dinner. An Israeli restaurant stormed and terrorised by protesters chanting ‘death to the IDF’. This is not protest. This is hate. And it has no place in Australia.”

In reply one person wrote: “I hope they raised the insurance cover before they lit it on fire, no need to let a false flag go to waste (p37).”

After police released an image of the person who lit the East Melbourne fire, someone who reposted the image and appealed for information received the reply, “I’m just going to say it. He is most probably a Jew in disguise keeping the fear porn narrative alive so new laws are introduced (p40).”  

Many that weren’t blaming the local Jewish community were blaming Israel, or specifically Mossad. One claimed “the whole thing is fishy. Mossad is at it again (p59).” Another wrote, “Multiple ‘Anti-Israeli’ attacks in Melbourne last night were all FALSE FLAGS by MOSSAD operatives (p59).” Another writes, “the number one reason for the worldwide rise in antisemitism is the actions of Israel. They are masters at false flag operations, don’t be surprised if this is another by the professional victims (p56).”

These references to Mossad and Israel are not the “criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country”, which IHRA’s Working Definition of Antisemitism clearly says “cannot be regarded as antisemitic”. Rather, these attacks are a “targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity”, which are a manifestation of antisemitism according to the definition.

In the aftermath of these attacks, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said: “antisemitism has no place in Australia. Those responsible for the shocking attacks in Melbourne last night must face the full force of the law and my Government will provide all necessary support towards this effort.”

His post received 219 likes and 304 comments. In social media terms this is referred to as being “ratioed”, a sign of rejection of the underlying post because likes to show support require less effort than comments.

One of the comments read, “#FFS Albo, it’s NOT antisemitism to oppose Zionism, it’s NOT antisemitism to oppose genocide, AND it’s obvious to any decent person that splashing some flammable liquid on a door of a building NEXT DOOR to a major fire state is a lame false flag attack by Zionists AGAIN #auspol (p49).”

This response cuts to the heart of the issue. While some openly embrace and celebrate antisemitism, and others accept that it is a form of racism and a social ill, they just refuse to identity anything as actually being antisemitic. Not even setting fire to a synagogue while the community eat Shabbat dinner inside is viewed as antisemitic.

How on earth did we get to this point?

The problem is the assertion by pro-Palestinian groups that the mainstream Jewish community in Australia is conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism. This is not based on any Australia data but is a talking point imported from overseas. Instead, we have in Australia clear evidence of the opposite conflation, the idea that pro-Palestinian activism is inherently anti-racist and therefore cannot ever be expressed in a racist or antisemitic manner.

“The IHRA definition of antisemitism explicitly includes criticism of the policies of the State of Israel with antisemitism and has been effectively deployed in Australia. While we recognise the very important work of this organisation, we reject this simplified conflation of antisemitism with criticism of Israel,” wrote APAN and the Australian Jewish Democratic Society in a joint statement in 2020. This misrepresents the IHRA definition, which says that in general criticism of Israel is NOT antisemitism, but some expressions of such criticism CAN be antisemitism.

In 2024, the Jewish Council of Australia described a rally to counter antisemitism as a conflation of antisemitism with criticism of Israel, and cited only one example to justify this headline: the use of “from the river to the sea”, which is a pro-Palestinian slogan but cannot be described as a “criticism of Israel”.

This broader narrative has been reinforced by Jewish pro-Palestinian activists. At one time it was possible to be pro-Israel and pro-Palestine. It was called the two-state solution. Most Jews, and even the government of Israel, were in support of it. Since October 7, and the focus on Gaza, Hamas has become the focus of the pro-Palestinian movement.

Because Hamas never supported the two-state solution, this has reshaped the narrative about what it means to be pro-Palestine. Today if one wants to be pro-Palestine, it is not about reclaiming territories occupied in 1967, but about the claims to all of what was once the British Mandate of Palestine before 1948. Hence, the rallying cry of “from the river to the sea”. So, to be Jewish and pro-Palestine in 2025, one must therefore be anti-Zionist, against the very existence of Israel.

Now redefined as anti-Zionists, Jewish Palestinian activists declare that “anti-Zionism isn’t antisemitism”. The Jewish Council of Australia used this logic when it wrote a report classifying concern expressed to a parliamentary inquiry into antisemitism at universities as being either “anti-Zionist or Pro-Palestinian” or as being “antisemitic”. By making two mutually exclusive categories, the volume of what they accepted as antisemitism was greatly reduced.

To be clear, I am not arguing that anti-Zionism is automatically antisemitism. It certainly can be antisemitism, but it can also be done in a manner that is not antisemitism. The same goes for Palestinian advocacy in general. Asking if something is anti-Zionist or pro-Palestinian tells us precisely nothing about whether it is also antisemitic or not.

To tell whether something is antisemitic, we need to focus on that question specifically. A definition helps, particularly one that has been adopted broadly, such as the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism that, as of April 1, 2025, has been adopted by more than 1,300 entities, including 47 countries and 384 educational institutions. The European Union’s plan for Combating Antisemitism from 2021 noted the importance of the definition and its use at both the European level and nationally in each European country.

The attempt by Australian Palestinian Advocacy Network (APAN), the Jewish Council of Australia, and anti-Zionists to label the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism “controversial” and dangerous has slammed the pendulum into the wall. It has created a situation where some see nothing as genuine antisemitism and most antisemitic activity is framed as being only anti-Zionism.

This leads to a point when nothing is considered antisemitic, and thus Jews are seen as fair game.

To combat antisemitism, we need a plan. Jillian Segal provided it. It’s left many in shock as it exposes institutional antisemitism and calls for cultural change. She says that the basis for this change is adopting the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism at all levels of government and across society. But we need to know how to do that. The Special Envoy’s office is developing a handbook, much like Canada did, to help clarify that task.

The plan also proposes a range of consequences for antisemitism, but not everything that is antisemitic will have consequences, and not everything antisemitic will be illegal. The definition does not define the law – it says this explicitly at the end. It only helps us identify antisemitism. It is a relevant consideration, nothing more. Any changes to the law will of course need appropriate safeguards and the availability of judicial review of any decisions.

What we do once antisemitism is identified is another matter. In calibrating the response to antisemitism, we cannot start by redefining antisemitism and refusing to recognise some of its manifestations. That’s how we ended up in this mess to begin with. My fear is that, as has occurred with laws in this space in the past, the barriers to accessing remedies will be set too high, making the response more symbolic than practical.

The summary to the Online Hate Prevention Institute’s new report is titled “Conclusion: A dead canary”. I restate it here. We are past talking about a risk to the fabric of our multicultural society. We are past talking about what might happen. We are already in the day after the crisis. After the Christchurch attack, after the Port Arthur massacre, after the Ash Wednesday fires. We know the crisis and we see the harm. We need a plan. We need a response. We need action. We need to learn from best practices around the world, and particular from Europe.

In 2019 President Macron announced a crackdown on antisemitism saying, “Anti-Zionism is one of the modern forms of anti-Semitism. This is why I'm confirming that France will put forward the definition of anti-Semitism as drawn by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance."

I would add that it is the particular flavour of the anti-Zionism seen in France, and increasingly today in Australia, that is a modern manifestation of antisemitism – not all anti-Zionism. The situation in France, and crises in other parts of the EU, led to strategies to counter antisemitism.

The problem in Australia is not one antisemite, or a small group of agitators. The problem is that antisemitism has been normalised and socialised. It has been institutionalised. We need to find a way out of this situation. Not just the Jewish community, but Australia as a whole. This is not who we are. The Plan to Combat Antisemitism from the Special Envoy gives us a way forward, but it will require broad support, and already the tenor of public debate shows that a campaign is underway to undermine that support.

The Jewish community is not asking for special treatment, it is asking for an appropriate response to a crisis, no different to the drought relief for our farmers, the childcare support for families struggling with the cost-of-living crisis, or the NDIS. The canary may be dead, but there is still time for Australia as a whole to get out of this dark place. If we don’t, Australia will no longer be Australia.