The failures that allowed October 7 to happen

IDF and Shin Bet investigation reports released last week exposed a chain of systematic operational and intelligence failures that Hamas exploited to deliver a well-coordinated attack on October 7.

The findings point to specific failings but also expose the need for a broader independent commission of inquiry to uncover how the attack was not anticipated and prevented.

While the Shin Bet probe acknowledged serious internal shortcomings, it largely pointed to external factors. The IDF’s internal investigations focused on specific failures on the day of the attack but have not yet addressed the broader systemic issues that enabled them.

The detailed inquiries are alarming for those familiar with the IDF and Shin Bet, revealing a breakdown in military procedures—both in frontline unit expectations and in the meeting of those expectations.

Families who lost loved ones on October 7 continue to demand an independent commission, arguing it is the only way to uncover the truth, assign personal responsibility, and prevent future failures. They claim the government is avoiding this to escape scrutiny but vow to continue their fight despite the humiliation and disregard they face.

Shin Bet agency chief Ronen Bar admitted that had the agency acted differently, "the massacre would have been avoided." The internal and external investigations found serious lapses, but many details remain classified to protect intelligence methods.

The report highlights a critical failure—the inability to provide a suitable warning about Hamas’s preparations. While Shin Bet correctly assessed Hamas’s threat level—unlike the government and other security services—it failed to translate this into an actionable warning. A key intelligence gap was its lack of human sources in Gaza, with no agents providing any forewarning of the attack. Instead, spies in Gaza reported a "routine atmosphere" before the assault.