The failures that allowed October 7 to happen

IDF and Shin Bet investigation reports released last week exposed a chain of systematic operational and intelligence failures that Hamas exploited to deliver a well-coordinated attack on October 7.

The findings point to specific failings but also expose the need for a broader independent commission of inquiry to uncover how the attack was not anticipated and prevented.

While the Shin Bet probe acknowledged serious internal shortcomings, it largely pointed to external factors. The IDF’s internal investigations focused on specific failures on the day of the attack but have not yet addressed the broader systemic issues that enabled them.

The detailed inquiries are alarming for those familiar with the IDF and Shin Bet, revealing a breakdown in military procedures—both in frontline unit expectations and in the meeting of those expectations.

Families who lost loved ones on October 7 continue to demand an independent commission, arguing it is the only way to uncover the truth, assign personal responsibility, and prevent future failures. They claim the government is avoiding this to escape scrutiny but vow to continue their fight despite the humiliation and disregard they face.

Shin Bet agency chief Ronen Bar admitted that had the agency acted differently, "the massacre would have been avoided." The internal and external investigations found serious lapses, but many details remain classified to protect intelligence methods.

The report highlights a critical failure—the inability to provide a suitable warning about Hamas’s preparations. While Shin Bet correctly assessed Hamas’s threat level—unlike the government and other security services—it failed to translate this into an actionable warning. A key intelligence gap was its lack of human sources in Gaza, with no agents providing any forewarning of the attack. Instead, spies in Gaza reported a "routine atmosphere" before the assault.

Signs of an imminent attack emerged on October 6, including Hamas operatives activating 45 Israeli SIM cards overnight. However, when Shin Bet and IDF officials convened at 4:30 A.M. on October 7, they opted for only limited preparations to avoid escalation. Rather than raising the alert level, the warning was downgraded to its lowest possible level.

While admitting its own lapses, Shin Bet also pointed blame at Israeli policy in Gaza, particularly under Benjamin Netanyahu, who served as prime minister for 13 of the last 15 years. Unlike the IDF, Shin Bet never accepted the misconception that Hamas had been deterred. It opposed allowing Qatari funds into Gaza and Palestinian workers into Israel, warning Netanyahu that Hamas was using these funds for military purposes.

In February 2023, Shin Bet's intelligence assessment wrongly concluded Hamas didn’t want war, but it did warn that Israeli policies—including Temple Mount tensions and harsher prison conditions—could provoke a major attack.

The report also details multiple warnings by Shin Bet chiefs urging Netanyahu and previous governments to assassinate Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif. The prime minister didn’t approve these plans, including one final recommendation just before the attack, driven by Hamas’s West Bank operations.

Over the past week, senior officers have presented findings from 40 battle investigations to affected communities and the media. Reports on battles at Kibbutz Kfar Azza and the Nahal Oz military base have been released, with further inquiries on Kibbutz Nir Oz, Kibbutz Nahal Oz, and Netiv Ha’asara expected soon. These detailed accounts expose severe failures in military procedure, from unrealistic demands on frontline units to a lack of enforcement.

Each report includes a graph showing the imbalance of forces hour by hour. Initially, Hamas attackers vastly outnumbered defenders, who suffered heavy casualties before military reinforcements arrived. In Kfar Azza, 250 terrorists faced just 14 security squad members, all local residents—half of whom were killed. The IDF, overwhelmed by the scale of the assault, failed to respond for hours, leaving civilians to fend for themselves.

A pattern emerges across all inquiries: complacency along the Gaza border. The IDF was unprepared for a coordinated, large-scale attack, with inadequate intelligence, low readiness, and insufficient weaponry. The Gaza Division collapsed within two hours. One investigator told Haaretz: “The issue isn’t just declining discipline—we’ve forgotten how to defend.”

Intelligence recovered during Israel’s military offensive in Gaza later revealed Hamas had been refining its attack plan since 2017, incorporating live-streaming, deception tactics, and symbolic target takeovers. Hamas twice delayed the assault to strengthen its forces. The IDF’s Military Intelligence Research Department missed at least 10 warning signs over two years, including a Hamas-produced TV series that eerily foreshadowed the October 7 massacre. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had praised the program, which depicted infiltration tactics later executed in real life.

Speaking in the Knesset on Monday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu again rejected calls for a State Commission of Inquiry into the October 7 attacks. Initially, he argued that such an inquiry could not take place during wartime. However, he now cites concerns from cabinet ministers that it would be biased against the government. Critics say Netanyahu fears an independent probe could expose failures by him and his ministers.

Members of the October Council—including bereaved families, survivors, and former hostages—urged Netanyahu to establish a commission, calling it essential for justice, truth, and future security. Despite their pleas, Netanyahu remains unmoved.

Outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi echoed their demand, stating in his farewell speech that "It is not right for only the IDF to investigate such an event; it is part of a national order. Establishing a state commission of inquiry is vital and critical, not to assign blame, but primarily to get to the root of the problems."

A State Commission of Inquiry is an independent body appointed by the Supreme Court chief justice, with broad investigative powers, including subpoenaing witnesses. Previous commissions have examined military failures such as the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the Sabra and Shatila massacre (1982). While they can issue recommendations, they have historically avoided calling for a prime minister’s resignation.

The Movement for Quality Government in Israel petitioned the High Court, calling the cabinet’s refusal to act a "new pinnacle of shirking responsibility." The High Court granted the government 90 more days—until May 11—to update its position. In a recent cabinet hearing, an "overwhelming majority" of ministers deemed the timing "not ripe" for an inquiry.

Despite Netanyahu’s opposition, a commission will eventually be formed, argues Herb Keinon of The Jerusalem Post. Public pressure is mounting, with polls consistently showing broad support for an inquiry led by the Supreme Court. If this government refuses, a future one—likely after the next elections, due by October 2026—almost certainly will.

Shortly before the Knesset debate, security guards forcibly removed bereaved parents from the October Council as they attempted to protest.

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Shin Bet probe: Oct. 7 would have been prevented if we’d acted differently (The Times of Israel)

Probing October 7, Shin Bet points fingers at Netanyahu, fueling tensions with PM (Amos Harel, Haaretz) 

Shin Bet ignored sim cards, sensor warning on Oct. 7, probe finds (The Jerusalem Post)

October 7 inquiry: the demand that won’t go away (Herb Keinon, The Jerusalem Post)

Three Terrorists Murdered 17 Israelis: How Kibbutz Netiv Ha'asara's Defenses Failed on Oct. 7 (Haaretz)

Why Did Knesset Guards Viciously Assault Victims of Hamas' October 7 Attack? (Haaretz)

No Defense, Lax Standards: IDF's Initial Probes Into October 7 Massacre Are Infuriating and Horrifying (Amos Harel, Haaretz)

What we’ve learned: 7 shocking insights from the October 7 reports (Ynetnews)