Iran-Israel war puts Saudi Arabia in a difficult position

During an interview with the ״The Atlantic״ in 2018, the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, compared Khamenei to Hitler. This statement expressed the dramatic change in the Saudi policy towards Iran.

Over the years, the Saudi leadership saw the Islamic Republic and its ideology as the biggest threat to the region and to the kingdom in particular, but at the same time it took a conciliatory line towards the ayatollahs' regime.The recognition of Saudi Arabia's security and strategic inferiority compared to Iran, along with the royal family's consistent avoidance of being drawn into regional conflicts, has led to a restrained and cautious policy toward its neighbour. Bin Salman's words marked a clear end to the era of Saudi restraint. No more moderate and measured language, but quite the opposite: public statements against Tehran, accompanied and backed by proactive actions (for example: forming regional coalitions).

However, this policy also came to an end, perhaps sooner than expected.  Saudi Arabia's nearly decade-long war of attrition in Yemen exacted a heavy, perhaps too heavy price, without any significant results. In 2023, Tehran and Riyadh announced the renewal of their relations, each driven by its own interests. Since then, a series of high-level meetings between senior officials from both countries has signalled the beginning of a new era.

The war in Gaza should have set back the renewed dialogue and highlighted the deep divisions in the interests of the two regional powers, which are reflected in three main areas:

1. Attitudes toward Hamas: Iran provides ideological and financial support to Hamas, whereas Saudi Arabia regards the Palestinian Authority as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Moreover, from the Saudi perspective, the October 7 terrorist attack served as clear evidence of the dangers inherent in Hamas’s actions .

2. Attitude towards Israel: While Iran calls for the destruction of Israel, Saudi Arabia was one step away from signing a peace treaty with it shortly before the war.

3. Relations with the US: Iran sees the U.S. as the "Great Satan" and has long faced American-led sanctions. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, is a longstanding U.S. strategic partner with deep ties to Washington.

Not only did their differing positions on these issues fail to cool relations, quite the opposite. A series of diplomatic collaborations, ranging from participation in joint conferences, to direct phone calls between Riyadh and Tehran, and meetings between the foreign ministers of both countries, all indicated, at least outwardly, that common ground outweighed their differences.

Both countries describe Israel's military actions in Gaza as war crimes and share a mutual concern about the destructive impact that continued Israeli operations in Gaza could have on the broader Middle East.

The absurdity reached its peak with the Israeli strike on Iran, that began on June 13, 2025. Although this move clearly served Saudi interests, the royal family chose to condemn Israel. For many Israelis, the Saudi response was surprising and infuriating. How could Saudi Arabia, which undoubtedly benefits from a severe blow to its greatest enemy, choose to extend a hand to the aggressor rather than the victim?

However, a closer look at Saudi Arabia’s interests may shed light on the logic behind its response:

Above all, the critical question remains whether Israel will be able to translate its military operations into a long-term political strategy. Without converting military gains into diplomatic progress, there is a real risk that the Israeli-Iranian front will devolve into yet another war of attrition, with uncertain outcomes, but already devastating consequences.