Lebanon’s tortuous journey to regain its sovereignty

After the election of a new president, formation of a new government, and parliament’s vote of confidence, it appears that Lebanon’s state institutions are now ready to launch a much-needed campaign to reform the war-torn and bankrupted country.

A key element in the success of a reform campaign will be the government's ability to curb Hezbollah's disruptive influence over the country.

As the only militia that did not disarm after the Lebanese civil war ended in 1989, while enjoying the patronage of Iran and the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah has since become the political hegemon of Lebanese politics. It has operated with unlimited freedom, building its massive independent military and social infrastructures.

Hezbollah has flourished for decades due to its ability to exploit the weak Lebanese state institutions for its own political purposes. The organisation’s existence as a powerful and independent Iranian proxy depended on its ability to breach the country’s sovereignty by keeping its independent armed wing; massive smuggling of arms, money and men through the unregulated borders; and escaping from any accountability for its acts of political violence and terror in the domestic arena.

After the recent war with Israel, Hezbollah finds itself at an unprecedented low point. Its leadership is seen as weak and inexperienced, it has suffered significant military losses, and it is in deep financial crisis. Most important is the fact that the movement is cut off from its main supply routes of funds and weapons in Syria due to the fall of the Assad regime.

Hezbollah also had only limited success in transforming the recent funeral of Hassan Nasrallah, its late popular leader for the past 30 years, into a massive show of force, while messaging to the organisation's rivals in Lebanon that it is still a force to be reckoned with.

The overwhelming presence of Iranian officials, the absence of Lebanon’s new president and prime minister, and the relatively low public turnout (estimated between 200,000-450,000, far less than Hezbollah's fabricated claims of over a million) are signs of the legitimacy crisis Hezbollah is facing in the Lebanese domestic arena.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah is far from being eliminated as a political and military entity. It still enjoys the support of many of Lebanon's 1.2 million Shiite population and together with the Shiite Amal movement, its close political ally, it has control over five ministries within the new government.

In addition, Hezbollah still commands a military wing of some 50,000–60,000 armed men and (as demonstrated in the riots that erupted around Beirut's airport and the armed clashes along the Lebanese-Syrian border a few weeks ago) is still able to, and will probably, use violence to protect its vital interests. 

The organisation will most likely try to use its influence on the new minister of finance, a Shiite close to the Amal movement, who was appointed only after Hezbollah's consent, to divert funds from the state treasury to support its own financial agenda.

The same can be said regarding the Ministry of Health, which is headed by a Shiite minister nominated by Hezbollah. It will exert influence on the minister to funnel money from the ministry budget to cover the huge expenses of health services needed for the thousands of Hezbollah military operatives who were injured during the war it initiated against Israel.

The airport authorities' recent exposure of a $2.5 million smuggling attempt and the reports that Iran used the massive arrival of Shiites to participate in Nasrallah's funeral to smuggle millions of dollars through the airport, exploiting the security forces' inability to check the masses, is a clear indication that Iran and Hezbollah are adamant in continuing to defy the new government’s efforts to regain the state’s sovereignty.

By now it has been already exposed that Hezbollah is using the networks of collaborators it employs inside the Lebanese armed forces to foil and disturb its disarming in southern Lebanon, which was a condition of the ceasefire agreement with Israel. 

Of course, Hezbollah rejects the notion of the state's monopoly over the use of arms, which was publicly announced by the new president and government, as part of the vision of restoring the country’s sovereignty. Through media outlets affiliated with the organisation, it has already issued public threats, stating that any attempt to order the army to disarm Hezbollah will lead to internal strife and defections of Shiite personnel from the army.

Similarly, the Shiite top cleric in Lebanon, Mufti Ahmed Kabaln, has also joined Hezbollah’s campaign to foil the call to disarm the organisation and warned that any attempt to do so will lead to a severe domestic crisis.

Hezbollah’s current weakness presents an unprecedented opportunity for the Lebanese state authorities to shake off its grip over the country. However, as the organisation and its patrons in Iran are adamant about rebuilding Hezbollah’s capabilities and strictly reject the idea of disarming its military wing, there is a real risk that Lebanon's domestic stability will be challenged in the upcoming months.

As Hezbollah’s existence is dependent on weak sovereignty and dysfunctional state institutions, the mere idea of institutional reforms stands in contradiction to Hezbollah’s core interests. Under these circumstances, it is expected that it will use all its capabilities to prevent the new government from fulfilling its vision.

Thus, it falls upon the international community and Sunni Arab states to back up President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam in their efforts to implement reforms. A combination of “carrots”, in the form of massive Western and Arab aid, and “sticks”, in the form of reliable threats of economic and diplomatic sanctions, should be deployed as the main course of action to push forward the highly needed reforms in Lebanon.

At the same time, a campaign of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and military force must be constantly used against any attempt by Iran and Hezbollah to breach Lebanon’s sovereignty or to use political violence to promote their interests by destabilising Lebanon domestically.

RELATED STORIES

A U.S.-Iran axis is emerging within the Gulf states, bypassing Israel (Haaretz)
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates maintain good relations both with Iran and the U.S. and have an interest in preventing war. Becoming a 'protective ring' for Teheran could lead them to negotiate over the nuclear program.

In Netanyahu’s new Middle East, Syria could become Israel’s biggest strategic gain (CNN)
Just hours after Islamist rebels ousted longtime Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stood at edge of the occupied Golan Heights and looked out over Syria. The historic downfall will create “very important opportunities” for Israel, he said in a video message.