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HomeRead, Watch, ListenIsrael
Israel Hamas WarAnalysisIsrael

The future: three options remain after a year of fighting

October 7 shook Israel out of outdated political and existential paradigms and thrust it into a long and controversial war in Gaza. One year on, the long term results of the Hamas attack remain unclear.
Elhanan Miller
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Published: 1 October 2024

Last updated: 7 October 2024

The series of sirens and dull Iron Dome interceptions that shook me from my sleep on the morning of October 7, 2023, bore deep symbolic meaning. Looking back at that fateful day a year later, I feel that – like many fellow Israelis – I have experienced a rude intellectual awakening.

Today, many of us are forced to re-examine outdated political and existential paradigms, often referred to in public Israeli discourse as “the conceptzia”.

Our system of beliefs, shattered on October 7, concerned both the capabilities of our military and intelligence services, but also the political and diplomatic paradigms within which our government operates.

I am not a military expert, nor do I have the insider information required for a proper analysis of the former. Hence, I would rather focus here on the latter. In doing so, I will offer three possible scenarios for the future.

Just two weeks before Hamas’ surprise attack on Israeli communities in southern Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the UN General Assembly in New York. In a rare policy speech, Netanyahu outlined his diplomatic paradigm vis-à-vis the Palestinians. The Israeli leader was optimistic that a peace deal with Saudi Arabia was imminent, asserting that normalisation with the entire Arab world would soon follow.

“Many dismissed my optimism as wishful thinking,” Netanyahu said, referring to criticism he had faced prior to the signing of the Abraham Accords in September 2020. “Their pessimism was based on a quarter century of good intentions and failed peacemaking.”

Hamas made a bold, last-ditch attempt to galvanise Palestinians around a project of “resistance” that would return their cause to the top of the world agenda. A year later, we can safely say they have succeeded in that.

The West (and Israeli left) traditionally held that peace with the Arab world could only materialise as a result of normalisation with the Palestinians. But Netanyahu seemed to have disproven that paradigm. Israel, he argued, could reach peace with important regional players such as Morocco and the UAE without the painful territorial concessions they said it must pay.

Netanyahu reversed the causality of his detractors: if the Arab world came first, the Palestinians – isolated and desperate – would be forced to jump on the normalisation bandwagon. For him, “peace” meant economic prosperity for Palestinians, but the abandoning of their dream of national sovereignty.

“See, the Palestinians are only 2% of the Arab world,” Netanyahu stated on September 22, 2023. “As long as they believe that the other 90% will remain in a warlike state with Israel, that larger mass – the larger Arab world – could eventually choke, dissolve, and destroy the Jewish state. So when the Palestinians see that most of the Arab world has reconciled with the Jewish state, they too will be more likely to abandon the fantasy of destroying Israel.” 

The “Netanyahu paradigm” went up in smoke on October 7. Realising their cause was rapidly and effectively being pushed to the bottom of the international agenda – and emboldened by Israel’s social unrest in late 2023 – Hamas staged an unprecedented surprise attack.

Far from giving up hope and falling in line, Hamas made a bold, last-ditch attempt to galvanise Palestinians around a project of “resistance” that would return their cause to the top of the world agenda. A year later, we can safely say they have succeeded in that.

Given the year-long closure of the West Bank to Israel, with anger simmering as unemployment skyrockets, it is almost a miracle that matters there aren’t much worse.

But Hamas has also miscalculated. Its military leadership believed that its “shock and awe” attack would spur Palestinians across the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Israel into action. In a voice message broadcast on Al-Jazeera on the morning of October 7, Hamas fugitive Muhammad Deif (later assassinated by the IDF) called on Palestinians everywhere to take arms and attack Israelis.

There was good reason for him to believe he would succeed. The previous conflagration with Gaza, in 2021, quickly spiraled into a domestic Israeli crisis that teetered at times on the verge of civil war. Synagogues and mosques were set ablaze, Jews and Arabs attacked each other on the streets of mixed Israeli cities.

But that did not happen, at least not on the scale Hamas had wished. As I write these lines, Israeli-on-Israeli nationalistic violence is almost non-existent, and, despite heightened violence in the West Bank (and the calls of many radical protesters in the West), we are certainly not experiencing a third Intifada. 

The media never focuses on catastrophes averted; on violent attacks that did not happen. But given the year-long closure of the West Bank to Israel, with anger simmering as unemployment skyrockets, it is almost a miracle that matters there aren’t much worse. I attribute this to the wise leadership of Israeli Arab and Palestinian politicians committed to calm, as well as the sense of fatigue and danger felt by most Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line.

This is not to say, however, that greater danger does not loom on the horizon. But alongside the threats, there are also opportunities. I would like to outline the worst-case scenario for Israel, as I see it, and then describe the best-case scenario. I will conclude with what I believe is the most likely script for the future, while considering Rabbi Yohanan’s maxim in the Talmud: “Since the destruction of the Temple, prophecy was taken from prophets and given to fools” (Bava Batra 12b).

1. Regional war

Unable to realise a hostage-for-prisoner deal with Hamas that would end the war in Gaza, Israel continues its low-scale operation in the Strip. IDF soldiers continue to die daily as army units attempt to destroy Hamas’ depleted infrastructure and locate Yahya Sinwar, as well as the remaining hostages. Hezbollah – committed to continuing attacking Israel’s northern communities with rockets and drones as long as fighting goes on in Gaza – escalates its operations until it hits a sensitive Israeli target. The damage caused by the attack forces Israel to retaliate with greater force, dragging Iran into the fold.

At that point, escalation could lead to a regional war, involving the US and other Western allies on Israel’s side, and Russia more forcefully siding with the “axis of resistance”. This war would be immensely damaging to both Israel and its neighbors, but fail to change the basic features of the powers at play.

2. Regional peace

Having severely damaged Hezbollah’s operational capabilities through its pager attack in September, Israel decides to secure an agreement with Hamas. All remaining Israeli hostages are released in return for thousands of Palestinian prisoners, many of whom are deported overseas. A coalition of moderate Arab forces take control of the Gaza Strip, gradually enabling the Palestinian Authority to reassert itself in Gaza through a three-year reconstruction plan. The Lebanese government, taking advantage of Hezbollah’s weakness, rushes to sign a border demarcation agreement with Israel, forcing all armed factions to withdraw north behind the Litani River, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

With the war over, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declares early elections in a bid to secure his position within Likud, before a national inquiry commission submits its findings. Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states announce their willingness to spearhead a regional peace initiative in return for Israeli recognition of Palestinian statehood in the future. The Israeli left directs its election campaign to endorse the Arab peace proposal.

3. More of the same

Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to manage a low-scale war on two fronts, Gaza and Lebanon, well into 2025. Hamas continues to release video footage of living Israeli hostages languishing in captivity, with its leader Sinwar nowhere to be found.

But frustrated with their inability to secure concessions for their Ultra-Orthodox constituents, Shas and United Torah Judaism withdraw from Netanyahu’s coalition, leading to elections within three months. The outcome of elections is inconclusive, with neither Natanyahu’s Likud nor Gantz’s National Unity able to form a stable coalition. A cross-factional government is finally reached, with vague commitments to regional peace and an end to the war, which remains elusive.  

Hear Elhanan Miller speak on Hamas and Israel: How did we get here? What next? in Melbourne on 9 October, Canberra on 10 October, Sydney on 12 October. Bookings here.

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About the author

Elhanan Miller

Elhanan Miller

Elhanan Miller is a Jerusalem-based journalist and teacher.

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Comments2

  • Avatar of Deborah Stone

    Deborah Stone7 October at 09:04 am

    Thanks – that correction has been made.

  • Avatar of Deb Solomon

    Deb Solomon6 October at 08:06 pm

    An excellent article.

    (Please correct spelling from oversees to overseas
    “ All remaining Israeli hostages are released in return for thousands of Palestinian prisoners, many of whom are deported oversees. ”)