Gaza ceasefire falters as Israel and Hamas prepare for next war

According to Israeli and regional reporting, Haddad also played a central role in rejecting elements of Trump’s 20-point reconstruction framework for Gaza, particularly provisions tied to Hamas disarmament and the transfer of authority to a technocratic administration backed by Arab and international actors.

His assassination therefore carried both military and political significance. Operationally, Israel demonstrated that it retains deep intelligence inside Gaza and the capacity to target senior Hamas figures, despite the ceasefire. The killing was celebrated by many Israelis as overdue accountability for October 7 and a morale blow to Hamas.

However, the strategic implications are far less clear. Israel has eliminated much of Hamas’ senior military leadership over the past two years, yet the organisation continues to function. Hamas remains weakened compared with its pre-war position, although it still governs large parts of Gaza, controls significant civilian infrastructure and appears capable of regenerating leadership. Reports already point to Mohammed Odeh, the head of Hamas military intelligence, as a possible successor to Haddad.

This reflects the central dilemma confronting Israel in Gaza. Tactical successes and targeted killings continue to accumulate, but they have not yet translated into a decisive political outcome.

While the ceasefire formally remains in place, the reality on the ground looks increasingly like a slow return to active conflict.

According to Reuters, citing Gaza Health Ministry figures, Israeli strikes killed 120 people in Gaza after the Iran ceasefire alone, including women and children. The pace of attacks reportedly increased significantly compared with earlier weeks while Israel’s attention was focused on Iran.

At the same time, humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate. Aid deliveries remain inconsistent, fuel and building materials are heavily restricted, and the Rafah crossing has repeatedly opened and closed, depending on security conditions and Israeli policy decisions. International agencies continue warning that Gaza’s civilian infrastructure remains close to collapse.

But the most significant shift may be territorial rather than humanitarian. Under the October 2025 ceasefire agreement, Israeli forces withdrew to a demarcation zone known as the “Yellow Line”, controlling roughly 53 per cent of Gaza. Since then, Israel has quietly expanded the areas under its control. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly acknowledged this week that Israel now controls around 60 per cent of the Strip.

International aid organisations say new Israeli military maps indicate an even broader “Orange Line” that could place nearly two-thirds of Gaza under Israeli control.

For critics of the Israeli government, this increasingly resembles the creation of a long-term buffer zone, which could permanently fragment Gaza geographically and politically. For Israeli officials, however, expanded territorial control is increasingly viewed as essential insurance against Hamas rearmament.

Nickolay Mladenov, the former UN diplomat now serving as the Board of Peace’s senior representative for Gaza, warned that the current trajectory risks turning Gaza into a permanently divided territory. “And at that point,” he warned, “Gaza is gone.”

The core assumption behind the Board of Peace initiative was that reconstruction, international investment and political normalisation could eventually pressure Hamas into surrendering military control over Gaza. That assumption now appears increasingly fragile.

Mladenov acknowledged publicly this week that Hamas continues to reject the principle of disarmament despite multiple rounds of negotiations in Cairo.

The proposal itself was relatively expansive. It reportedly included weapons buyback schemes, conditional amnesties, safe passage abroad for Hamas members unwilling to comply, and the integration of some Hamas-linked police officers into a future technocratic administration. Yet even these concessions appear insufficient.

The Board of Peace now finds itself trapped between Hamas’ refusal to surrender power and Israel’s refusal to permit large-scale reconstruction, while Hamas remains armed. That leaves the mediators with very little leverage.

Mladenov himself effectively admitted this reality when he acknowledged that the only meaningful pressure on Hamas is the threat of renewed Israeli military action. Ironically, that same threat also risks destroying the relevance of the diplomatic process itself.

Increasingly, both Israel and Hamas appear to be preparing for the possibility that the current stalemate will end in renewed war. Israeli officials openly acknowledge that Hamas has no intention of disarming. Michael Eisenberg, an adviser to Netanyahu, bluntly told the BBC that “everyone understood that Hamas would not disarm”.

The IDF has meanwhile expanded its military presence west of the border and continues consolidating control over large areas of Gaza. Hamas, for its part, is reportedly recruiting fighters, rebuilding military infrastructure and restoring elements of its tunnel and rocket systems.

For now, Hamas appears careful not to provide Israel with an immediate trigger for a massive offensive. But few observers believe the current situation is sustainable indefinitely.

The deeper problem is political rather than military. The Israeli government continues rejecting the possibility of returning Gaza to Palestinian Authority control under an Arab-backed framework, while simultaneously insisting Hamas cannot remain in power. Yet without an alternative governing structure capable of taking control, Hamas remains the default authority in much of Gaza.

Much now depends on Washington. Donald Trump has shown reluctance to launch another major regional military escalation, particularly after the Iran confrontation. Israel remains closely aligned with US policy calculations, meaning any full-scale return to war in Gaza would likely require at least tacit American backing.

For the moment, the result is an unstable middle ground: a ceasefire that increasingly resembles low-intensity war, a diplomatic framework with limited leverage, and two sides preparing for a confrontation neither appears fully able to avoid.

The assassination of Izz al-Din al-Haddad may therefore prove significant not because it changed the balance of power in Gaza, but because it exposed how close the region may already be to the next round of fighting.

READ MORE 

No. 1 eliminated, Hamas still survives (Avi Issacharoff, YnetNews) 

Gaza risks becoming permanently divided, top official warns( CNN) 

Four months in, can Trump's Board of Peace for Gaza turn plan into action? (Liza Rozovsky, Haaretz) 

Killing Hamas' military chief in Gaza, Netanyahu again hails tactical success as strategic gain (Amos Harel, Haaretz)