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Israel’s election on October 27 is being described by many opposition figures as the most consequential in the country’s 78-year history. Such claims are common during election campaigns, but this time the concern extends beyond which party will govern. At stake, critics argue, is the character of the state itself.
They fear that another victory for the right-wing and religious parties led by Benjamin Netanyahu would clear the way for fundamental changes to Israel’s system of government. These could weaken the judiciary and other institutional checks, alter the relationship between religion and state, entrench unequal public funding and deepen the divide between Jewish and Arab citizens.
The election will also determine whether Israel continues to organise itself around the expectation of perpetual war, what Netanyahu has called becoming a “super-Sparta”, or attempts to restore some form of political, economic and social normality.
Other disputes feed into this wider choice: the future of Haredi military exemptions, accountability for the October 7 attack, the role of the IDF as a people’s army and the growing burden placed on reservists and their families.
The cost of living, crime and violence, and national unity also ranked prominently. By contrast, security and diplomatic questions, such as dismantling Hamas or expanding West Bank settlements, were less likely to be identified as voters’ first priority.
That does not mean security has disappeared from the campaign. Rather, it is increasingly being judged through a broader question: what kind of Israel will emerge from the country’s longest war?
Will the judicial overhaul continue?
The judicial overhaul remains the clearest dividing line between the competing political blocs. Justice Minister Yariv Levin introduced the government’s original legislative package in January 2023. Its implementation was interrupted by mass protests and then by the October 7 attack, but the coalition has continued advancing legislative and administrative measures that would reduce judicial oversight and strengthen executive power.
One of the most important proposals concerns the attorney-general. The legislation would allow ministers to disregard the attorney-general’s currently binding legal opinions and give the political leadership greater influence over appointing and dismissing the person holding the office. Supporters argue that unelected legal officials and judges have accumulated excessive power at the expense of elected governments. Critics see the legislation as part of an attempt to remove one of the few remaining constraints on executive authority.
The stakes are increased by the number of Supreme Court appointments expected during the next government’s term. The incoming coalition could be responsible for appointing eight of the court’s 15 judges, potentially reshaping the institution for decades.
For many opposition voters, issues that once stood separately, corruption, religion and state, public funding, settlements and minority rights, are now viewed through the prism of the judicial overhaul. Without an independent court and attorney-general, they argue, there would be little to prevent a government from rewriting the rules in its own favour.
Right-wing voters often see precisely the opposite: an opportunity to complete a democratic correction that the courts and protest movement prevented the current government from delivering. The JPPI survey found judicial reform was the most important issue for 49 per cent of right-wing respondents.
Who will investigate October 7?
The election will also decide what kind of inquiry examines the failures surrounding the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023. Netanyahu has resisted establishing an independent state commission of inquiry, whose members would be appointed by the Supreme Court president. He argues that the court’s leadership is politically biased and cannot be trusted to select an impartial panel.
Instead, the coalition has advanced legislation creating a politically appointed commission. Coalition and opposition representatives would each appoint three members. However, because opposition parties have vowed not to participate, the inquiry could operate with only the coalition’s appointees, allowing the government in power during the attack to determine who investigates its conduct.
Bereaved families, survivors and former hostages represented by the October Council have accused the government of seeking to avoid responsibility rather than uncover the truth. Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara has also criticised the proposed model.
A Netanyahu-led coalition would probably continue with a political inquiry. An opposition or unity government would be far more likely to establish a state commission with subpoena powers. The election is therefore also a contest over who writes the official history of October 7, and whether political leaders will be held accountable.
Can the IDF remain a people’s army?
The Haredi draft exemption may be the most dangerous issue for Netanyahu within his own political base. Israel’s ultra-Orthodox parties are demanding permanent exemptions from military service for yeshiva students, as well as continued funding for educational institutions that generally do not teach the full national curriculum.
The dispute has become far more explosive since October 7. Hundreds of thousands of reservists have spent months away from their families and employment, while soldiers from secular, traditional and national-religious communities have carried much of the human cost of the war.
At the same time, the IDF says it urgently needs thousands of additional soldiers. Yet of 53,000 draft notices issued to Haredi men in one year, only 701 reportedly presented themselves in response.
The resulting anger is especially significant among national-religious and right-wing families that have traditionally supported Likud or its coalition partners, but have served heavily during the war. For these voters, the exemption is no longer an abstract argument about religion and state. It is a test of whether citizenship involves shared obligations, and whether the IDF can continue to function as a people’s army.
Arab communities have experienced record levels of violent crime. According to figures cited by the Knesset and the Center for Advancing Security in Arab Society, police solve only about 15 per cent of homicides in Arab communities, compared with 65 per cent in Jewish communities.
The opposition nevertheless faces a political challenge: persuading Arab citizens that voting can produce meaningful change. If Arab turnout remains low, Netanyahu’s bloc will benefit. If it rises and Arab parties avoid internal fragmentation, they could influence which bloc can form a government.
Perpetual war or a return to normality?
Despite the centrality of security to Israeli life, the major parties have offered few detailed plans for ending the country’s multiple open conflicts or resolving the Israeli-Palestinian question.
The government’s position is clearer in tone than in strategy: Israel must continue fighting until it achieves “total victory”, even if that means years of military mobilisation and recurring operations across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Yemen and the West Bank.
The opposition is likely to campaign on restoring security alongside normality. However, its leading figures remain divided over Palestinian statehood, settlements and territorial compromise. Naftali Bennett opposes a Palestinian state, while Gadi Eisenkot has concentrated on Netanyahu’s security failures without presenting a comprehensive peace plan.
The choice will therefore not necessarily be between war and peace. It may instead be between accepting perpetual war as Israel’s organising principle and seeking diplomatic arrangements that reduce the number of open fronts.
Can Israelis afford the status quo?
Economic pressures will tie all these issues together. The cumulative military and reconstruction costs of the war have been estimated at hundreds of billions of shekels. Much has been financed through additional government debt, higher taxes and cuts to civilian services, while controversial allocations to coalition constituencies have continued.
Although average wages have broadly kept pace with inflation, these figures cannot capture the full impact on households: lost work, repeated reserve duty, damaged businesses, higher housing and food costs, and deteriorating public services.
The JPPI findings show that the cost of living becomes particularly prominent when voters nominate their second and third priorities. It may not define the election on its own, but it could determine how Israelis judge every other promise.
Ultimately, the campaign’s individual issues are strands of the same argument. Israelis will be deciding whether to continue with a political project that prioritises concentrated executive power, religious and nationalist coalition demands, and long-term military mobilisation, or to pursue institutional restraint, shared civic obligations and some prospect of returning the country to normal life.
That is why, for both Netanyahu’s supporters and opponents, this election feels less like a routine contest over government and more like a referendum on Israel’s identity and future.
Dr Shahar Burla is a Sydney-based researcher, lecturer and Contributing Editor of TJI. Shahar holds a Master’s degree in political science from Hebrew University and a PhD in political science from Bar-Ilan University. He is the author of Political Imagination in the Diaspora: The Construction of a Pro-Israeli Narrative (2013) and co-editor of Australia and Israel: A Diasporic, Cultural and Political Relationship (2015).
Continued Security for Israelis will be the main concern not Judicial Review This will require the Strongest IDF possible but with without war crimes and with a determined protection of civilian life to prevent isolating Israel from the Human Rights Democracies.
A Unity Government of the Zionist Opposition and Likud is most likely to achieve this .
Comments1
Mark Ian16 July at 07:56 am
Continued Security for Israelis will be the main concern not Judicial Review This will require the Strongest IDF possible but with without war crimes and with a determined protection of civilian life to prevent isolating Israel from the Human Rights Democracies.
A Unity Government of the Zionist Opposition and Likud is most likely to achieve this .